Abstract At the end of Republic V Socrates argues that differences between knowledge and opinion justify rule by philosophers in his ideal city; within this argument he gives a theory of powers. The theory contains a logical gap: Socrates mentions two criteria by which he individuates powers, yet assumes in his argument that both criteria will speak with a single voice. I argue that these criteria are two ways of picking out a power's manifestation-that is, the change a power is directed toward; I shall call this view the Identity Reading. Since they refer to a single phenomenon, the results of consulting both criteria cannot differ. The Identity Reading both solves the logical problem with the argument and sheds light on four other features of the passage. This reading also provides support for what Gail Fine has called the "contents analysis" of a power's relation to its "objects," as opposed to the "objects analysis."
I begin by explaining the puzzle and its centrality to the argument. I next argue that what the two features refer to is the manifestation of a power. This view raises further questions: how can Socrates' formula "being epi x" be a way of referring to a power's manifestation, and why should Socrates use two phrases if both refer to the same phenomenon? Finally, I show what is gained from adopting this reading.
Readers may be especially interested in the consequences of my argument for the overall argument about knowledge and opinion in this passage. The view I argue for is a version of what Gail Fine calls the "contents analysis" as against an "objects analysis": that is, to say that knowledge is epi x is to say that x is the propositional content of the knowledge in question, rather than to say that knowledge is related to an object in the world.
2 This is because the objects analysis applied to the epi relation says that for a power to be epi x is for it to be related to an entity distinct from the power itself (and distinct from its manifestation).
As I shall argue, the numerical distinctness of a power (and its manifestation) from what it is epi makes the argument in the text question-begging. The contents analysis does not require this kind of distinctness, so the view I shall argue for, the Identity Reading, supports it.
Finally, it is widely recognized that of the three competing ways in which "is" can be read in this passage, the existential and predicative senses are natural allies of the objects analysis, while the veridical sense goes with the contents analysis. It follows that the Identity Reading is committed to the veridical reading of "is" (in most places), and to the contents analysis.
3
The Passage
Near the end of Book V Socrates proposes that philosophers should rule, explaining that philosophers are those who love knowledge. As a counterexample, Glaucon describes a group of "sight-lovers," who seem to love some forms of knowledge; Socrates counters that philosophers love the truth (475e4) and they must therefore love the forms. 4 The sight-lovers 2 Of course this reading of being epi x does not commit its proponent to saying that there are no objects to which knowledge is related;; it only claims that the talk of knowledge being "epi what is" is not talk about those objects. 3 For details of these readings and arguments see Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in Republic V" and "Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII," in Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays (Clarendon Press, 2003) . 4 The philosophers are also described as loving all kinds of knowledge, as opposed to loving some kinds but not others (474c8-75c8). This may serve partly to distinguish them from the craftspeople in the city, who have knowledge of their own crafts (428b7-c10), but not of things beyond their own occupations (434a3-b7).
do not even acknowledge the existence of the forms, so they fail to qualify as philosophers by this criterion (475e2-475d6).
One might think the argument has now ended successfully. But Socrates embarks on a second argument for the same conclusion, this time addressed to the sight-lovers themselves (476e4-480a13). This argument shows that since knowledge and opinion are different powers, they are necessarily epi different things; therefore what can be known is different from what one can hold an opinion about. In this argument Socrates must eschew claims the sight-lovers would not accept, including appeals to the existence of forms.
5
Socrates interrupts this second argument to propose a theory of powers with two main claims. First, powers are real and are what enable us to do whatever we are able to do.
Second, he explains how to differentiate one power from another as follows:
A power (δυνάμεως) has no color for me to see, nor a shape, nor any feature of the sort that many other things have, and that I can consider in order to distinguish them for myself as different from one another. In the case of a power, I look only at (εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω) The Constraint is puzzling, since at first glance the two features Socrates looks at seem to be two distinct entities. As Rachel Barney writes, "Plato seems to offer one sufficient condition too many…" 9 Note that Socrates' remarks about the individuation of powers would create no puzzle without the Constraint. Socrates is of course free to look at as many criteria as he might wish to for individuating powers, and he might propose any procedure for making a judgment about whether two (or more) putative powers are in fact the same power.
His view is only puzzling because he seems to posit two separate criteria, but then treats them as if they were in fact a single criterion.
Since the use Socrates actually makes of the criteria is clear, the only scope for solving the puzzle lies in thinking about what the criteria refer to. Crombie, Gosling, and Hintikka all saw that the text requires that what a power is epi and what it does be related in some intimate way that prevents them from varying independently. 10 Crombie proposes that what a power is epi is an "internal accusative," that is, the power's own manifestation as named by a verbal formula similar to the power's own name. Thus, for example, the power of opinion is epi opinions, and the power of sight would be epi things seen. On Gosling's view, the two criteria refer to more or less the same phenomenon, although his description of this referent is not entirely clear. According to these readings the two criteria are either redundant or unclear: redundant if they refer to exactly the same thing, unclear if there is some difference we cannot discern. I will defend an account similar to those of Crombie and
Gosling, but I shall both argue more carefully for the view and be more definite about what the two criteria refer to.
Why we cannot avoid the Constraint
Two initially plausible thoughts about the two criteria, both of which would deny the Constraint, either fail to fit the text or render the argument question-begging.
First, overlooking the Constraint, one might suppose that for a power to be epi x is just for it to exercise its power on x, much as one might use a tool on an object. 11 Just as it is possible to hit a wide range of things with a hammer, then, one might suppose that a typical power can be brought to bear on a large range of objects, so that the nature of the power in question plays little or no role in determining what these objects are. To say that a power is epi some object just means that this power is being brought to bear on that object, without implying any closer connection between power and object. This reading renders the argument question-begging. For if a power can be epi various objects, then Socrates has no reason for thinking that knowledge and opinion are epi different things just because they are different
powers-yet this inference is central to his argument. I am not aware of anyone who holds this view in the strong form I am describing, but it is worth setting out as an extreme against which the next, more plausible view can be compared. Further, many authors seem to read the epi relation in ways that fall somewhere between this view and the next to be described:
these authors probably would not endorse the extreme liberality of the epi relation given by this first view, but neither do their proposals restrict the relation between powers and objects to a one-to-one relation, as the following view does.
The second view is as follows. It recognizes that what a power is epi and what it does cannot be completely independent of one another. But, this line of thought goes, we do not need a relation as strong as identity between the two criteria; what we need instead is some 11 Fine refers to both this and the following view as an "objects analysis" ("Knowledge and Belief in Republic V," 69). for the claim that opinion and knowledge do different things, and are therefore different 12 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this example, and to more than one referee for suggesting variations of this idea. 13 Stokes, "Plato and the Sight-Lovers of the Republic," 119-20.
powers. But they say nothing to show that different powers must always be epi different things, except in giving the individuation conditions for powers. So the individuation conditions themselves must provide some grounds for accepting the claim; if they do not, the argument is question-begging. To claim that knowledge and opinion are naturally fitted to different things cannot show that this must be the case; yet it is the stronger claim that
Glaucon relies on (478a13).
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On this second type of view, then, there is at least a typical, or better, a natural relation between each power and what it is epi, and this is enough to secure a one-to-one relation between powers and their objects. One might say, for example, "I care only about this, how many assets she has and what her purchasing power is." This view, however, is less successful than it first appears, for neither typical nor natural association are strong enough relations to justify excluding cases (3) and (4) in an argument about knowledge and opinion. The very least that Socrates needs is that knowledge and opinion are necessarily different from one another; that is, there must be no possibility that knowledge and opinion might be epi the same things. And even this requirement is probably too lenient, for it is more plausible that Glaucon and Socrates are appealing to a general necessity covering all powers, not one restricted to the special case of knowledge and One might read the argument as question-begging, of course, but this is to be avoided if possible. Such a reading is available, as Crombie, Gosling, and Hintikka all realized. Their proposals gave a valid argument, but failed to explain how and why Socrates' two criteria could be read as referring to the same target. This difficulty can be solved by paying more attention to the fact that Socrates is discussing powers.
Socrates on Powers
In contemporary philosophy a power is a property whose nature is to enable whatever 19 Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in Republic V," 73.
20 While medicine and gymnastics make an intuitively plausible example, note that Plato himself is careful in the Gorgias to avoid saying that medicine and athletics are two powers. Instead he describes them as a single craft with two parts. The same passage describes other practices that also deal with the body, that is pastry-baking and cosmetics, but these are called empirical "knacks" that do not qualify as crafts-and so, one suspects, they are also not genuine powers. This treatment is consistent with the view that Plato avoided commitment to distinct powers that would be epi the same things.
has it to bring about some change or to do something; the change it is directed toward is its manifestation. 21 For example, the power of heating is the property enabling its bearer to raise the temperature of things in the vicinity; its manifestation is the increase in temperature.
22
Socrates' δυνάμεις in this passage are recognizable as powers in the contemporary sense by their dispositionality: they are what enable their bearers to do whatever they are able to do. 23 In the same way, the second "thing" he looks at to individuate powers, "what it does", seems to describe the power's manifestation.
24
On the Identity Reading, saying that a power is epi x means that x is its manifestation.
Thus, when Socrates apparently gives two criteria for individuating powers, in fact both criteria refer to the same phenomenon. This is the reason that cases (3) and (4) cannot arise.
This solves the logical problem, but to make the reading convincing we need to show that the text supports this approach. In the following section I give three further arguments for this reading, and then consider three objections.
Three Reasons, Three Objections
The first reason favoring the Identity Reading is that Socrates introduces the two 23 Socrates says that powers are αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅτι περ ἂν δύνηται, "that by means of which we are able to do what we are able to do, as well as everything else whatever it can do" (477c1-2, my translation). 24 Is Socrates really thinking of δυνάμεις as properties? "Property" here means a way something is which gives it the ability to bring about some change: in this sense Socrates is discussing properties. Socrates later speaks of the power of sight coming to be in the eye, corroborating the view that he is thinking of powers as properties possessed by things (508a-b). Second, in what follows, "potential" and related terms are based on Socrates' heavy use of δύναμις and related words, combined with contemporary thinking about powers; these are not attempts to read Aristotelian concepts back into Plato. I am grateful to anonymous reviewers for raising these issues. other entities (477c6-d1). The power of sight, for example, is the power that produces seeing as its manifestation; therefore any power producing this manifestation is the same power, and any power producing another manifestation is a different power.
If one starts by thinking of knowledge and opinion as states, it is easy to assume that they deal with external, independent objects. This thought leads naturally to the objects analysis, treating what a power does as numerically distinct from what the same power is epi.
Recognizing that knowledge and opinion are powers, on the other hand, we should expect that what each power is epi is not independent from what the power does. The third reason favoring the Identity Reading, then, is the suspicion that competing readings fail to take 30 τί δὲ σύ;; πῶς ποιεῖς;; (478d5-6, my translation).
31 This claim, of course, is defeasible. Socrates might be ironically inviting Glaucon or the sightlovers to claim a view that Glaucon has never thought about before. But Glaucon does not express surprise or confusion, as he often does in other parts of the Republic. I see no positive reason for thinking that Glaucon and the sight-lovers could not recognize in Socrates' words a view that they already hold. Second, Santas objects that at 477c6-d6, in describing his method of individuation,
Socrates repeats his two phrases three times within one sentence. Santas takes this to show that two distinct referents must be intended. 34 At most, however, the repetition shows that
Socrates finds something significant or useful about using both phrases rather than just one;
this falls far short of showing that they must refer to two distinct things.
Third, Ian Crystal argues that the use of τε…καί shows that there are two distinct referents, writing that this connective "…is standard Greek for expressing two distinct things.
It emphasizes their difference".
35 This is one way an author might use τε…καί, but even granting that the phrase emphasizes some difference between the things connected, we still
need to ask what difference this is. Since this is precisely the question at issue, Crystal's suggestion fails to rule out my reading.
Further, a nearby passage, 474d1-5e1, provides at least one -and probably more than one -counterexample to Crystal's claim. 36 This passage pairs several verbal formulae, and in a few cases the two clearly refer to the same thing. Plato, then, uses these connectives to join terms referring to identical items as well as terms referring to numerically distinct items. It is a further question whether expressions thus connected refer to the same or distinct objects.
The objections to the Identity Reading are therefore weak. But we also need solutions to two further problems.
The first asks how saying that a power is epi x can be a way of referring to that power's manifestation. That is, it is far from obvious that "what a power is epi" is a way of referring to that power's manifestation;; we need to show that understanding it this way is plausible. The second problem is closely related: if both phrases do refer to a power's manifestation, why does Socrates use two phrases -why not just talk about what a power does, and omit the phrase with epi?
37
The objects analysis may seem to have an advantage on this question, since one thing's being epi another seems to indicate a relation between two different items. "x is epi y"
can be translated "x is upon, over, or against y" -so one does not expect x and y to be related as part to whole or as source to product. Since a power's manifestation is easily thought of as part of or a product of the power itself, the Identity Reading seems to conflict with the epi phrase. 37 "An adequate interpretation…must explain both (1) how the two phrases for distinguishing between powers are related and (2) why they are introduced as distinct phrases" (Gonzalez, "Propositions or Objects," 267). Cf. Gosling, "Δόξα and Δύναμις in Plato's Republic," 124. 38 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
The most plausible candidates for the best reading of επί are domain and purpose.
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The phrase may indicate a domain, the set of objects a power acts on or interacts with in order to produce its manifestations. One can take this to mean that sight, for example, is epi the domain of visible objects. 41 But the idea of purpose deserves a hearing, since Luraghi observes that this meaning "is mostly triggered by the occurrence of abstract nouns" , and the phrase ἐφ' ᾧ ἐστι is an abstraction par excellence. 42 On this approach one might translate ἐφ' ᾧ ἐστι as "the [purpose] for which [a power] is," or "a power's purpose."
The reading of ἐπί as indicating purpose shows that the Identity Reading's solution is viable: the phrase ἐφ' ᾧ ἐστι is plausibly read as describing a power's purpose, that is, its manifestation. Further, on this reading we can also see why the domain reading (or objects analysis) has seemed obviously right. If powers are conceived as distinct from their own manifestations, then it follows that what a power is epi is also distinct from the power itself.
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It is undeniably easy to form the impression, when reading this part of the Respublica, that what powers are epi is something distinct from the powers themselves. This may motivate some of the plausibility of the objects analysis. But it now turns out that the contents analysis can explain this impression as well: what knowledge and opinion do, and are epi, are the same entity, and this entity is distinct from the power that gives rise to it. Insofar as we have merely an impression that in discussing the epi relation, Socrates is referring to entities numerically distinct from the powers that produce them, this impression should be counted in favor neither of the objects nor of the contents analysis, since it is equally explained by both views.
Finally, if both phrases refer to the same thing, why not just use one phrase? I answer that the epi expressions refer to a power's manifestation prospectively, that is, as something the power is directed toward but is not at the moment actually producing. This gives the epi expression a force in the same neighborhood as, but not necessarily the same as, Aristotle's "potential." III.2 for purpose. Of course ἐπί is capable of more shades of meaning than those I list here, but these are the most plausible choices. 41 Reeve, Blindness and Reorientation, 135-6. 42 Luraghi, On the Meaning of Prepositions and Cases, 302. 43 This view is at least suggested in Book I at 346e.
44 I have avoided the word "potential," except here, so as not to imply that Plato's sense of "being epi x" is the same as Aristotle's sense of "potential.
" Such a claim would prejudge many questions and is
One sentence in particular reveals the semantic difference between Socrates' two phrases. Socrates asks, Each of them, then, since it has a different power, is epi something different? ᾿Εφ' ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἕτερον τι δυναμένη ἑκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν;; (478a4, Reeve's translation modified).
The phrases "᾿Εφ' ἑτέρῳ" and "ἕτερον τι δυναμένη" seem to express the same meaning: to be epi something is the same as to be able (δυναμένη) to do something. In order to make the two phrases semantically equivalent, Plato has added the word δυναμένη to the second. That is, the wording shows that being epi something is not equivalent to doing something, but rather to being able to do something. This supports the view that ἐφ' ᾧ expresses an ability or tendency to do something, while "what a power does" expresses an actual doing.
The two phrases therefore refer to the same phenomenon, but pick it out in different ways. The epi phrase refers to a power's manifestation prospectively, leaving aside whether the power is actually producing the it. "What a power does" refers to the manifestation as actually produced, and therefore as something tangible and observable: the prefix ἀπο-in ἀπεργάζεται emphasizes the finished, completed aspect of the manifestation (LSJ s.v. ἀπό
D.2).
The difference can also be illustrated in English. Consider a radiator whose power to heat produces the manifestation of heating. 45 We can think about either what its power is for or what it does: both refer to its power to heat, but the first is not committed to thinking of the power as actually manifesting. If one points to a cold radiator and asks, "What is this for?" one can answer that it is for heating. On the other hand, if one asks , "What is this radiator doing?" one can only answer that it is heating if it is actually heating. Yet both ways of talking refer to the same manifestation, heating. Socrates' use of both phrases may be a way of emphasizing that powers are real regardless of whether they are currently producing their manifestations.
Further Results
Four additional aspects of the text are also explained better by the Identity Reading.
First, this approach makes Socrates' standard for having knowledge somewhat less almost certainly false. 45 This is an illustration of the view, not an argument for it. Such an argument would be faulty, since the example depends to some extent on the English present progressive tense ("is doing").
demanding than it would otherwise be, and this makes it easier for him to claim that there would be philosophers available to rule the ideal city. Socrates has claimed that philosophers should rule in answer to a challenge by Glaucon that he should show that his ideal city was possible, and how it was possible (471c6-7, e3-4); soon after our passage Socrates recognizes that the nature required for philosophers is rare (502a-503d Socrates' argument, but he may also see that the bar for achieving knowledge is being lowered.
One might object that Socrates' goal is, on the contrary, to make knowledge more difficult, in order to exclude the sight-lovers. This is one of his goals, but if he achieves it by making knowledge too difficult, knowledge will be such a rare achievement that this will become an objection against the possibility of his city. Socrates in fact excludes the sightlovers not by setting a degree of difficulty they cannot meet, but by the absolute criterion that they lack knowledge -and they lack knowledge because they lack the power of knowing the forms. Given this method of excluding them, it is to Socrates' advantage to make the criterion for having knowledge less demanding, in order to make the availability of rulers for the city more plausible. Defining knowledge modally, as the ability to know the forms, gives Socrates 46 There is a debate over exactly how to understand this challenge and Socrates' response. But this much is clear: Socrates has a motivation for making the possibility requirement easier to meet, and on my reading his argument does this. See Mason Marshall, "The Possibility Requirement in Plato's Republic," Ancient Philosophy 28.1(2008): 71-85. 47 This claim is contrary to what is usually assumed, namely that Socrates thinks knowledge involves actually grasping or coming into contact with its object. For example, "Only philosophers have knowledge…because only they know forms…" (Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in Republic V," 67);; "In short, knowledge is here understanding and acquaintance, understanding achievable only in direct acquaintance with certain objects…" (Gonzalez, "Propositions or Objects?" 258) ;; "…the work of episteme is to make perfect cognitive contact with that which admits of only perfect cognitive contact…" (Boylu, "The Powers Argument in Plato's Republic," 120).
48 How can Socrates reduce his argumentative burden by adding the epi phrase, if both phrases refer to the same referent? The first phrase allows us to identify the power of knowledge if we can ascertain that it is aimed at the right kind of manifestation, just as we can identify a seed as an onion seed if we can ascertain that it is aimed at becoming an onion plant. The seed need not be an onion plant now in order to be so identified. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.
an ideal combination of claims: the wrong sort of people are absolutely excluded, while the right sort have their way eased.
Further, this advantage is only available to the Identity Reading. Readings employing the objects analysis (associated with reading ἐστι existentially or predicatively) are committed to reading the epi relation as a relation between a power and some objects that the power works on, or works with. But on this approach, Socrates is not drawing attention to the problem of how to identify a power even before it is actually producing its manifestation.
Readings employing the objects analysis, therefore, have no room to recognize any softening of the knowledge requirement for the philosopher-kings. The text, moreover, shows a strong concern with the practicality of Socrates' ideal rulers, and more specifically with the question whether there will be enough uncorrupted philosophers in a city to implement Socrates'
ideas. On my reading, one way Socrates responds to this concern is by defining knowledge in a way that makes it easier to find philosophers, without sacrificing their other desirable qualities.
Second On the Identity Reading, this nuance acquires a clear point and does work in the argument.
The objects analysis cannot explain this emphasis on modality in the straightforward way I have just suggested. For on the objects analysis, the epi phrase has nothing to do with modality. So while Socrates' other modal language indicates his concern with modality, the objects reading cannot show any way in which he answers this concern in his treatments of knowledge and opinion.
Third, this view can also explain why Socrates emphasizes that the sight-lovers deny the very existence of the forms, and correspondingly that philosophers believe in forms. 50 That the philosopher believes in forms, ἡγούμενός τι αὐτὸ καλὸν, is the first point describing
Had he not described these people as denying the existence of the forms, it would have remained unclear whether they were capable of seeing forms. Instead, the sight-lovers are defined largely by their denial that the forms exist: Socrates mentions this denial repeatedly throughout our passage. Now it is natural to think that if someone does not believe in a nonphysical thing, then she is incapable of "seeing" it. 51 Since Socrates has defined knowledge as being able to see the forms, he has a clear way of excluding the sight-lovers from knowledge.
For they would have to acknowledge that the forms exist in order to have any chance of "seeing" them;; and in taking this first step, they would no longer be the kind of people
Socrates and Glaucon are addressing here.
This point, too, depends on the Identity Reading of the epi phrase. On this reading, we know that philosophers are capable of seeing the forms because they have a power, knowledge, which is epi what is, and to be epi what is just means that the power is directed toward truth even if it is not at a given moment actually producing truths. On the objects analysis, by contrast, for knowledge to be epi what is means that it is applied to, or works in conjunction with the forms. On this reading, Socrates' use of epi is unrelated to the issue of belief in or acknowledgement of the forms. The objects analysis is therefore unable to shed any light on the modal way Socrates defines the sight-lovers and the philosophers.
Fourth, Socrates needs to introduce the epi phrase because of the logic of his dispute with the sight-lovers. Since these people are angry because he has denied that they have knowledge, they themselves must think that they do or might have knowledge. Thus, any putative example of knowledge Socrates might appeal to would likely be disputed, since in
Socrates' view a form will be involved, but the sight-lovers deny that there are such things.
So if Socrates had defined the power of knowledge only by what it does, he would be restricted to discussing what some given power had actually managed to do. This is the position he must be in according to the objects analysis. This would mean finding cases in which the power of knowledge has actually managed to know something: but what this power has accomplished, or in which cases it has accomplished this, is precisely what is under dispute. Socrates will not agree that the power exercised by the sight-lovers is knowledge, and they will not agree that there are such things as the forms, so they will hardly admit that a power attempting to see the forms, or partnering with them, is knowledge. 52 This impasse may explain Socrates' interrupting himself at 477b12-13, saying, "But first I think we had better go through the following."
What he gains by giving the theory of powers is mainly the ability to differentiate
powers based on what they are epi, what they would do if they were to reach their ends unhindered. He then uses the ἐφ' ᾧ ἐστι phrase to show that there is a difference between knowledge and opinion. For example, one of the key moves in the argument about knowledge and opinion comes at 478a4-b4, where the question is whether knowledge and opinion can be epi the same thing(s). Socrates establishes that they must be epi different things, and therefore that opinion cannot be epi "what is";; this launches the argument into a search for what opinion is epi.
For all four of these points, the advantages claimed for the Identity Reading might seem equally available to the objects analysis. In a sense this is true, but it is important to note that these explanations are vague and generic on the objects analysis. On the Identity
Reading, by contrast, we can point to the specific language, lines, and argumentative moves by which Socrates responds to all four of these concerns, and we see precisely how the epi phrase helps him deal with each issue.
Conclusions
I have argued that what seem to be two independent phrases for individuating powers are in fact different ways of referring to the manifestation-type of a power. The first phrase, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐστι, emphasizes a power's ability rather than what it has actually accomplished. The second, ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, refers to the same manifestation, but as something actually produced.
This reading solves the logical problem arising on the objects analysis: it can explain why each phrase is sufficient by itself to individuate a power and the two phrases cannot give conflicting guidance. Second, I have shown how to read being epi x in the passage. The best sense for epi in this passage is the idea of purpose rather than domain. Third, this proposal explains what Socrates gains by introducing both phrases rather than relying on one or the other. He gains flexibility in saying who might qualify as a philosopher-king, as well as the ability to absolutely exclude the sight-lovers from their pretense to rule.
Finally, this view of knowledge comports well with that presented in the Symposium, where the philosopher is between ignorance and knowledge. There is a theoretical slot available for a sage who has reached fully actualized knowledge of the forms, but that text makes clear that the philosophers we are likely to encounter will not be like that. Instead, they will have achieved some partial grasp of some forms, but they will count as philosophers largely in virtue of having the power to make progress toward more complete manifestations of knowledge.
